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How my Sales Role at TandemLaunch is Fundamentally Different from Ericsson

By Rawy Iskander

A year ago, I joined TandemLaunch Technologies to assume the business development function. Our mission is to deliver to our client base of large Consumer Electronic (CE) companies customized technology scouting and transfer across our vast global network of universities.

In this post, I reflect on the fundamental differences between the sales role with my previous employer Ericsson, where I spent more than 10 years in different sales roles, compared to TandemLaunch Technologies.

1. Customer requirements: At Ericsson, most of my customers had a pretty clear vision of their requirements. At TandemLaunch, we target organizations that have emerging demands that cannot be clearly articulated. There is no such thing called ‘established demand.’ In fact, the less our client is clear about their requirements, the higher the value TandemLaunch can deliver. At Ericsson, a sales person is primarily on a fact finding mission to identify customers’ unmet needs. We would then use this information to design a sales proposal in what was termed “solution sale”. At TandemLaunch we design our sales process to help both us and our customers “discover” their unrecognized needs.

2. Customer purchasing processes: At Ericsson, our customers had very well-defined and established purchasing processes. At TandemLaunch, our primary contacts inside these large organizations must be agile and flexible in purchasing decisions.

3. Customer Champion: At Ericsson we were trained to find an internal customer ally who was able to “coach” us through the maze of a complex organization and decision making. The bulk of the deal closing effort was ours! At TandemLaunch, such a profile cannot take us too far: our champion(s) must be able to initially challenge our proposals and help us quickly gravitate towards winning ideas. They must also be internal evangelists and go-getters. In fact we do the initial coaching but the bulk of internal persuasion must come from them!

4. Engagement timing: At Ericsson, the optimum time to engage with a customer was as soon as a need surfaced and we had identified that one of our solutions could help them. At TandemLaunch, we engage long before a need emerges since our role is to help our clients discover their future needs.

5. Sales engagement format: At Ericsson, the best engagement format was through customized well-rehearsed presentations that pitched solutions to identified customer needs. At TandemLaunch, we prefer customer workshops where we come in with many new concepts and work with our clients to discover what is useful and what is not. A well-thought-out, well-designed PPT flow prior to a meeting is quite useless. Interestingly, I realized that presentation skills are slightly less critical at TandemLaunch compared to Ericsson! This may come as a surprise to many people (including myself J) since we continuously pitch new concepts.  The fact of the matter is that it takes a long time to find a winning concept that is a good fit for a company to be fully-pitched. A longer and more critical aspect of the sales activity is to jointly discover these rare gems with our customers, so facilitation skills, thought leadership and the ability to challenge the status quo are more valuable skills with our business model.

I would love to hear your feedback, and insights on sales + business development activities. I am particularly interested in listening to your experiences on what worked and what did not…feel free to contact me!

A Sustainable Startup Model for Canada

At the end of my last post on the gaps in the R,D,E chain, I talked a bit about why people with the development skill set are attractive to large companies, but ultimately don’t fit in with these companies’ emphasis on engineering (e.g. rigour, discipline, process).  Startups are by far the best at the critical development piece between research and engineering, and yet the existing model for startups has them dissolve after acquisition.

Quite often when a company buys a startup they think that they actually want the organization, but the supporting jobs start disappearing, a bit later the technical staff will drift off, and in the end the whole place just shuts down.  Canada is full of acquired entities that followed this path.

That is OK on some level, because the transition will hopefully have brought some measurable amount of money or expertise into the country. But ultimately, it also means an economics loss: the loss of a company, the associated jobs, and a skilled development team that has found ways to work together effectively and efficiently.  This is especially important for a country like Canada where there are not a lot of big companies left that do engineering on a large scale (Nortel is gone, RIM is spiralling to the bottom, etc.).

So, how is it beneficial for the development capabilities of startups to be dispersed instead of being rolled into other development projects?  Industry really doesn’t want the development skill set in the long term, and every startup is forced to waste time starting their company from scratch. Following this traditional path is both capital inefficient for the startup as well as sub-optimal for the region in terms of long term economic growth. On the flip side, any law or policy that limits the ability of a startup in a small economy to be sold to the big players in another economy is fundamentally a mistake. Doing so just lowers the competitiveness of the venture and ultimately weakens the economy.

Having witnessed an economically successful cross-border acquisition and the aftermath, I can’t help but wonder if there isn’t a more effective way to build companies. This was on my mind when it was time to set up another venture in Canada: TandemLaunch Technologies was the result.

TandemLaunch is meant not only to solve the major international challenge of university-industry tech transfer, it is also meant to be a “sustainable startup” for Canada. TandemLaunch runs multiple development projects in parallel, each encapsulated in its own company to avoid cross-project distraction. Each portfolio company is structured in such a way that they are easy to acquire by industry, and allow industry to hand pick the technical resources that they need.  All other assets, including facilities and people, stay with TandemLaunch after any acquisition for assignment to new projects.

This means that the jobs created by TandemLaunch actually stay in the country of origin, grow in that country, and the money that is made on acquisitions is invested into future ventures in that country.  This maintains and creates jobs, and sustains a long term company.  All this, while transferring technologies into an organization that’s more effective at engineering, and ultimately consumer production.  The idea is to treat the invention and early prototyping steps that small economies like Canada are often very good at as the product of the larger entity. Each portfolio company has its own business model, revenue stream, and ultimately acquisition opportunities, but from the perspective of the larger entity they are revenue streams themselves.

Added side benefits are: the ability to create and maintain stronger industry connections, by the nature of multiple venture engagements; higher capital efficiency of each portfolio venture (avoiding a significant portion of ramp-up cost as the resources of past ventures are re-used where appropriate); and the fact that investment capital is maintained in the entity and thus the country (TandemLaunch is effectively an evergreen fund).

We will see how the model unfolds, but I have high hopes that it will lead both to financial success and an ongoing contribution to the local economy.

Gaps in the Research, Development, and Engineering Chain

I talk a lot about bridging the ‘technology transfer gap’, but there is more than one place where technologies fall to their doom in the development of a new product.  When you define each stage in the process (Research, Development and Engineering) you start to see that there are two clear gaps.  Between each of these stages, a risky transition occurs. It is not just a few outliers that fail to make each leap; it is the vast majority of inventions.  A big part of the reason for this is that very different environments work best for each stage of the R-D-E chain, meaning that technologies do not just need to transition between stages; they typically need to transition between organizations with different cultures and expectations.  Any “technology transfer” model needs to take both of these transitions into account. Let’s first briefly define the three stages.

The Research Stage. At the research stage, new ideas are proposed and tested, solutions to problems are sought or discovered, multiple ideas are combined, and inventions result.  The best macro-scale model that we currently have for this process is the university.  Universities provide the most open and free environments for research to occur, with by a wide margin the most financial resources ( Microsoft Research, probably the largest corporate research entity on the planet, spends about a billion dollars a year on research, which sounds like a lot, but it is still less than even a mid-sized university).

The Development Stage.  The task at the development stage is to rapidly risk-reduce an idea emerging from research (the process of innovation).  Outlier or extreme cases are considered, many of the scientific elements must be validated, and the fundamentals of how a new technology works will be tested and mapped out.  In other words, the technical risk of an invention not working are eliminated or largely brought under control.  This is what startups do best due to their focus, speed and flexibility.

The Engineering Stage. Products do not just need to have their technical risks resolved; they also need to be made.  That means designing the technology with aspects like cost reduction, manufacturing, production, shipping, and maintenance in mind.  Large companies, beyond any doubt, do this the best due to their economy of scale (at least in the case of hardware and similar scalable solutions).

With three steps in the chain there are obviously two transitions. And that’s where the trouble starts.

 Transition 1: Research to Development.  The usual problem in research to development transitions is that the open, loose form of universities (great for research) is a disaster for development.  In development you need focus, speed, agility, and risk money, none of which the university environment typically provides. Inventors, the most likely people to lead the technology’s development at a university, have far too many competing objectives and have much greater incentives and access to resources for basic research and invention then they do for development (for the most part).

At the same time, it is much more difficult to sell an undeveloped invention to a large company, precisely because their emphasis and strength is in engineering.   And that is assuming that universities, who are generalist by nature, are able to create and maintain the relationships needed with large corporate structures in specialized industries to pitch their inventions, and understand what the market need for these inventions is.

Transition 2: Development to Engineering. Development Startups face a similarly challenging cultural transition. At first glance that doesn’t seem to be the case. The skill set of startup developers is actually very attractive to big companies – at least in the early courtship days. Startup developers look dynamic, pro-active and goal-oriented. That is why big companies buy startups all the time.  After the acquisition, however, this beautiful vision starts to fracture a bit. Many of the best startup producers are hackers at heart. Product engineering on the other hand requires rigour, discipline and process – aspects that a startup will often deliberately suppress in order to progress faster, focusing on the key technical issues. Over time, “dynamic” becomes “can’t focus”, “pro-active” becomes “disruptive” and so forth.  That’s why most acquisitions ultimately fail.

 TandemLaunch Technologies’ mission is to improve the transition efficiency in the R, D, E chain in a way that is consistently beneficial to Canada (more on this in a future post).  We accomplish this by 1) identifying key researchers and inventions, 2) leading and providing the resources for the development stage of these inventions, 3) providing industry with a developed invention and the support they need for acquisition, and 4) keeping and creating jobs in Canada.

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